Hopes, Hesitancy and the Risky Business of Vaccine Development by Calnan, Michael & Douglass, Tom
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Calnan, Michael .W.  (2020) Hopes, Hesitancy and the Risky Business of Vaccine Development.
  Health, Risk & Society .    ISSN 1369-8575.    (In press)
DOI






EDITORIAL Health, Risk and Society  
Accepted for publication 02/11/2020 
 
Hopes, Hesitancy and the Risky Business of Vaccine Development 
 
Professor Michael Calnan (University of Kent) and Dr Tom Douglass (Ulster University) 
 
Abstract: 
Recent policy conversations about vaccination programmes primarily target the problem of 
vaccine hesitancy and the lack of public participation at the level required for community 
immunity, or herd immunity. In this editorial we will first explore the nature of public vaccine 
hesitancy, review what is known and demonstrate the significance of understanding vaccine 
hesitancy in the COVID-19 context. We argue that sociological research indicates that to 
sufficiently grasp vaccine hesitancy in the twenty-first century it is necessary to consider 
several aspects: the nature of medical decision-making, trust, risk and social responsibility, and 
the role of information technology and various forms of media. There are also questions about 
what influences the (successful) development and provision of a vaccine – issues that have 
been brought sharply into focus by the COVID-19 pandemic. As such, in the second half of 
the editorial we move to consider the supply side of vaccination. We examine what shapes this 
configuration and consider the role of key players such as those who manufacture the vaccines 
and, in turn, those who regulate development, again with a focus on the COVID-19 pandemic.  
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As of the autumn of 2020, there are more than 100 COVID-19 vaccines in the preclinical or 
clinical trial phases of development (Mullard, 2020, Whittaker, 2020) with the hope that one 
may be available for use before the end of 2020 or in early 2021. However, should vaccine 
development of one or more candidates prove successful, social dimensions will necessarily 
play a highly significant role in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, there 
are clearly significant manufacturing, distribution, delivery and administrative issues for 
governments to resolve in vaccinating millions of people, even within a single country 
(Bingham, 2020). Importantly, social and cultural beliefs and values will also be significant. 
Preliminary data suggest, for example, that in the US context, one-fifth of Americans, and more 
than half of people who already held beliefs of a sceptical nature toward vaccine safety, may 
be unwilling to receive a COVID 19 vaccination. This level of non-adherence rate may be high 
enough to pose a threat to collective immunity (Trujillo and Motta, 2020). The current COVID-
19 context suggests then that sociological analysis of vaccination has perhaps never been more 
significant. In this editorial we reflect on what a sociology of vaccination reveals about these 
issues and on what questions remain unanswered, particularly relating to the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
Vaccination has been available in the UK for over two hundred years beginning with 
smallpox vaccination in 1796. Since then a number of other vaccines have been developed for 
deadly and debilitating diseases such as typhoid in 1896, MMR in 1988 and HPV in 2009. 
Vaccination is seen as one of biomedicine’s greatest achievements. However, the social history 
of medicine shows us that the development and provision of vaccination and its uptake have 
consistently been controversial and met with resistance (Brunton, 2008, Porter and Porter, 
1988). Indeed, Dube and colleagues (2015) (see also Durbach, 2004) show how in response to 
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state attempts to control smallpox, compulsory vaccination acts passed into law in the mid 
1800s in the UK were viewed as a government assault on working class communities and 
resisted by individuals on the grounds that it was a violation of personal liberty. The 1950s and 
1960s might be characterised as a ‘golden age’ for vaccination and though there was still some 
level of opposition, vaccination was widely accepted with major decreases in outbreaks of 
preventable disease and death. However, vaccination (partially) became a victim of its own 
success and this did not last. Hand in hand with a diminishing sense of danger and significantly 
improved rates of various sorts of preventable disease and death, the 1970s saw controversy 
over pertussis vaccination (resulting in major outbreaks of the disease). Later, the 1990s 
infamously were marked by controversy over MMR vaccination and a purported connection to 
autism. Immunisation rates diminished from before the controversy to below 80 per cent, in 
less than 10 years, resulting in measles outbreaks and deaths). Many of the arguments initially 
made by the anti-vaccination activists of the 1800s remain concerns for those displaying 
hesitancy or outright resistance today. These include that vaccines cause disease or are 
ineffective, that vaccines contain substances that are dangerous, that harm and safety risk is 
hidden by medical and government authorities, that the state or medical authority institutions 
are not to be trusted, that natural immunity is superior than that created by vaccination and that 
naturalistic approaches to health are superior (Dube et al., 2015)1.  
Recent policy conversations about vaccination programmes primarily target the 
‘problem’ of vaccine hesitancy and the lack of public participation at the level required for 
community immunity, or herd immunity. In the early part of this editorial we will engage with 
 
1 It is important to note that, linked to this final point, the increasing popularity of 
complementary and alternative therapies have been seen to be one of the reasons why vaccine 




the nature of public vaccine hesitancy, review what is known and demonstrate the significance 
of understanding vaccine hesitancy in the COVID-19 context. Beyond the persistence of 
critical attitudes to vaccination, we argue that sociological research indicates that to sufficiently 
grasp and intervene into vaccine hesitancy in the twenty-first century it is necessary to consider 
in depth several additional dimensions. These include the nature of decision-making, trust, risk 
and social responsibility, and the role of information technology and various forms of media.  
There are also unanswered questions about what influences the successful development 
and provision of a vaccine. These questions have been brought sharply into focus by the 
COVID-19 pandemic (Calnan, 2020). The discussion later in the editorial therefore considers 
the supply side of vaccination, examining what shapes it and considers the role of  key players 
who develop, provide, organise, regulate and support the programmes - with a particular focus 
on manufacturers and the regulatory state.   
  
Public Vaccine Hesitancy  
Yaqub and colleagues (2014) define vaccine hesitancy as the harbouring of doubts about the 
benefits of vaccines and the questioning of their safety and necessity. Larson and colleagues 
(2015) argue that vaccine hesitancy is a kind of decision-making process that relies on 
particular approaches to risk and trust/confidence in health authorities. Interestingly, these 
authors show that there is significant disagreement about the extent to which vaccine hesitancy 
is shaped by socio-economic status. They suggest that it occurs, for example, across both those 
with low socio-economic status but also amongst university educated middle class people – 
although potentially in different forms, in terms of how trust attitudes and approaches towards 
risk manifest themselves. Vaccine hesitancy can very easily become vaccine refusal but these 
are arguably two distinct phenomena in that those who do choose vaccination can still hold 
hesitant views about benefit, safety and/or necessity. In this sense, vaccine hesitancy should be 
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seen as occurring on a spectrum that can include full or partial engagement with vaccination or 
vaccination refusal (Bedford et al., 2018, p.6557). Understanding hesitancy and the factors that 
underpin it is important because focusing only on refusal through uptake rates leads to 
underestimating the challenge of maintaining vaccination coverage in the future – particularly 
because hesitancy is a widespread phenomenon reported across a wide range of empirical work 
(see review by Yaqub et al., 2014). Equally, hesitancy towards a COVID-19 vaccination is 
likely to reflect many of the same factors that shape hesitancy to other vaccines in specific 
cases or at a general level. The focus on refusal rather than hesitancy is also predicated on 
assumptions about lay knowledge and decision-making which are inadequately appreciative of 
the range of sources drawn on in the process of (re)configuring attitudes and the importance of 
legitimacy and trust (at both interpersonal and institutional levels) and how this might vary 
over time and between types of vaccine. The picture is a more complex and nuanced one than 
that suggested by traditional medical assumption that a lack of access to information/the facts 
of vaccination (at least alone) drives refusal (Hobson-West, 2003, Yaqub, et al., 2014).  
 Decision-making about whether or not an individual or their child should be vaccinated 
is a rich, nuanced and contextual phenomenon (Reich, 2020) reflecting a number of factors. 
This includes interactions with family and friends – with Brunson (2013) and Attwell and 
colleagues (2018) showing that social networks shape and reinforce beliefs and subsequent 
vaccination behaviour. Other factors might include childbirth experience, past experience of 
vaccines or health services more generally, and necessarily also takes into account the presence 
of concerns about their own or their child’s broader health (Danchin et al., 2018, Hobson-West, 
2003, p.276, Hobson-West, 2007, Poltorak et al., 2005). The process, as such, is one that is 
distributed across a number of knowledges, experiences and interactions (Rapley, 2008) rather 
than as something simply reflecting a lack of access to the science of vaccination (Hobson-
West, 2003, Yaqub,et al., 2014). Reich (2018, pp.67-75) meanwhile argues that hesitant 
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parents, reflecting broader structural drivers to act as informed consumers, engage in ‘research’ 
or information gathering that can be central to the vaccination decision. A ‘good’ parent in this 
context is someone who ‘does the research’ and makes an individualised, informed decision. 
For those hesitant or resistant towards vaccination, vaccination adherence is constructed as the 
‘easy’, ‘unthinking’ decision rather than the result of a careful weighted decision about the 
benefits and risks (Hobson-West, 2005, pp.151-157).  
  A number of studies indicate the centrality of (dis)trust in the institutions and 
individual actors responsible for vaccination (Attwell et al., 2017, Peretti-Watel et al., 2019). 
Trust is therefore seen to be a key concept in understanding vaccine uptake although its 
investigation in much of the empirical research on vaccination is limited and lacks a clear 
conceptual basis (Larson et al., 2018). From their review of the vaccines attitudes literature 
Yaqub and colleagues (2014) show that the most commonly cited reason for general population 
support for vaccination is professional advice. The importance of trust in medical professionals 
in terms of provision of healthcare at various levels is, of course, well demonstrated by medical 
sociologists (Calnan and Rowe, 2008) and will undoubtedly be important in the provision of 
any successful COVID-19 vaccination. However, not all groups trust equally – for example, in 
the US context, black Americans, based on experiences of being failed by the medical system 
describe higher levels of mistrust than white Americans (Dew and Donovan, 2020). More 
generally, research shows that distrust in governments, the manufacturers of vaccines (and their 
desire to profit), as well as medical professionals and healthcare institutions are central in 
parental rejection of vaccination for their children (Attwell et al., 2017).  
However, as noted above and as Yaqub and colleagues (2014) indicate, though lessened 
or at least more critical in its composition, trust in professionals remains. In this way, 
professionals themselves may also be implicated in vaccine hesitancy or refusal. Medical 
professionals do not necessarily uncritically or unequivocally believe in and advocate for what 
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can be described as the culturally dominant vaccination narrative themselves (which describes 
how vaccination eradicated and controlled deadly diseases) (Heller, 2008). Indeed, Manca 
(2018) shows how professionals in Canada, despite also embracing their role in promoting 
vaccination, do hold certain anxieties especially around new vaccinations relating, for example, 
to the potentially problematic commercial influence of the pharmaceutical industry. This 
indicates that whilst trust in medical professionals is important in terms of patient and public 
attitudes towards and action associated with vaccination, professionals themselves are 
embedded in a lattice of (dis)trust that involves various actors including fellow professionals, 
health organisations and institutions and commercial forces. Professionals are largely trusted 
by patients, acting as mediators between patients and faceless systems, but trust by 
professionals in these various actors is significant in the configuration of professional 
understandings, attitudes and ultimately influences practice (Douglass and Calnan, 2016, see 
also Brown and Calnan, 2016 and particularly Brown and Calnan, 2012). Healthcare 
professionals do not always have significant knowledge of or awareness about vaccines and 
national guidelines (Yaqub et al., 2014, p8) but where they do, there sometimes are concerns 
about the longer-term efficacy and safety of newer vaccines such as the HPV vaccine (Gottvall 
et al., 2011). Where concerns and/or distrust, for example, in the commercial interests and 
influences of the pharmaceutical industry exists amongst medical professionals about 
vaccination and this is paired with public and patient trust in them this could shape vaccine 
hesitancy or refusal by the public, although this requires empirical exploration.  
Achieving herd immunity requires that 85-95 per cent of a community is vaccinated 
(though percentage estimates vary and relate to specific diseases) (Reich, 2020, p.108). 
Achieving herd immunity is desirable for governments because it protects public health and 
economic systems. Importantly, it also protects those in the community most vulnerable to 
infection (such as the immune compromised, those yet to be vaccinated or those for whom 
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immunisation is ineffective or has waned). Vaccination can, as such, be conceptualised as a 
social responsibility and vaccine hesitancy/rejection as possessing the potential to endanger 
other people (Attwell, et al., 2019). Considering the loss of life and economic damage caused 
by the COVID-19 pandemic, social responsibility attached to vaccination is likely to be 
significantly emphasised by governments. However, those who resist or reject vaccines 
personalise or individualise risk, emphasising how the risk of disease reflects an individual’s 
own mix of genetic, environmental, social and lifestyle risk factors (Hobson-West, 2007; 
Poltorak et al., 2005). Indeed, Prior (2003) suggests that older adults refusing flu vaccination 
do so because they believe individually that they are not themselves at risk. The rationalisations 
for this include that they have a healthy constitution and that they lead healthy lifestyles, that 
they are in some way ‘immune’ due to previous illness, or because they adopt avoidance 
strategies (Evans et al., 2007).  
In terms of the large-scale epidemiological presentation/understanding of risk and the 
social responsibility attached to vaccination, this view is presented as irrational. As Hobson-
West (2003) argues, however, a personalised understanding of risk in an increasingly 
individualised, atomised neoliberal society can actually be seen as completely rational – and, 
indeed, potentially reflective of the fact that individual responsibility and choice are 
emphasised in other areas of medicine and public health (Hansen and Easthope, 2007). If 
society is truly “made up of individuals behaving as risk-minimising-autonomous-rational-
consumers, then it makes sense to ‘free ride’. In other words, if we believe that others will 
continue to vaccinate it is rational for the individual to refuse the jab and avoid the personal 
risk, whilst still enjoying the collective benefits of herd immunity” (Hobson-West, 2003, 
p.277).  
In research on those who have refused vaccines for their children, Attwell and 
colleagues (2019) show that those refusing vaccination downplay the significance of the size 
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of the number of people refusing vaccination (thus not impacting community immunity) and 
deploy various rhetorical strategies to undermine or reconfigure narratives of social 
responsibility. This includes criticising vaccinating parents for not possessing the confidence 
in vaccination to realise that the unvaccinated do not pose risks to their children. Vaccines are 
a preventative public health strategy that label everyone at risk of disease rather than as 
‘healthy’ or ‘ill’ (Armstrong, 1995) but may nevertheless primarily be understood as a tool for 
individual benefit (Reich, 2020). Overall, this scholarship suggests a powerful disconnect 
between the population-level logic underpinning vaccination and a general public concerned 
with choice and the empowerment of the individual operating within a market economy 
(Blume, 2006, p.639, Hobson-West, 2003, Hobson-West, 2007, Reich, 2018, p.68-69).  
The most commonly cited reason for hesitancy towards vaccination is safety concern 
(Yaqub et al., 2014, p.3). For example, in some high-income countries such as France there is 
a relatively high rejection of vaccination because of concerns about safety (Wellcome Trust, 
2019). There may be more reflexivity, or higher levels of mistrust shown towards the interests 
and influences of the pharmaceutical industry within the public spheres of certain countries 
over other countries, something which requires further research – although countries of the 
world appear currently united in their current hope and faith in the pharmaceutical industry to 
lead the way out of the COVID-19 pandemic (Bingham, 2020. Evans and colleagues (2007), 
in a study concerned with the lay beliefs of older adults show that the reasons for refusing or 
defaulting on influenza vaccination included worries about side effects, concern that it would 
make them ill or that vaccination did not work (claiming, for example, that in a year that they 
had had the vaccine their influenza was worse). Considering the haste and political and 
economic pressures associated with the search for COVID-19 vaccination, concern about 
safety is already emerging (Whittaker, 2020). As discussed above, attitudes towards 
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vaccination and associated vaccination decision-making is comprised of, influenced by and 
distributed across a number of factors and influences (Rapley, 2008).  
That safety concerns are so central in vaccine hesitancy is perhaps hardly surprising 
considering the volume of news coverage of vaccine controversies. It is only possible to 
speculate at this stage on the role that traditional and new media will play in the configuration 
of attitudes towards any successful COVID-19 vaccination. However, Speers and Lewis 
(2004), in research concerned with both the nature of news coverage and public opinion about 
the MMR vaccination, conclude that that journalists served to misinform the public by not 
exposing the case against the link between autism and the MMR vaccination as rigorously as 
the case for it. Suppli and colleagues (2018) meanwhile highlight, with respect to Denmark, an 
association between negative coverage of the side effects of the human papillomavirus (HPV) 
vaccine and decline in vaccination uptake. The uptake had previously been 90 per cent but fell 
to 54 per cent in girls born only a few years later following the emergence of controversy in 
2014. Whilst the (potential) downstream influences of negative news coverage on public  
vaccine hesitancy are illuminated by these studies, interestingly, Jang and colleagues (2019), 
again in the context of the controversial link between MMR and autism, highlight how 
information that is generated and circulated on social media can flow ‘bottom up’ and influence 
mainstream media agendas.  
The internet certainly offers a diverse range of voice greater availability of access to 
information about vaccination but also the chance for those with anti-vaccination proclivities 
to spread their message (Dube et al., 2015) (and, as above, even potentially shape mainstream 
media discourse). In this sense, vaccine hesitancy and resistance might also be linked to the 
more general development of a populist post-truth society (Kakutani, 2018). Scientific facts 
have become the object of chronic debate and contestation and social media has been important 
in this, offering an opportunity to spread potentially false interpretations or information and to 
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gain and unite a significant audience (Arede et al. 2019). There is certainly evidence that 
vaccine hesitant parents utilise online information more so than those parents who have had 
their children vaccinated (Kata, 2012). Smith and Graham (2019), through analysis of the 
Facebook pages of anti-vaccination groups, reveal a community bound together by moral 
outrage over the ‘harmful’ practice of vaccination. Users feel suspicious of and lack trust in 
mainstream vaccination knowledge and practice as well as in medical and government 
authorities. The algorithmic and wider architecture of Facebook (and other social media), 
particularly through the means of ‘sharing’, may result in the views of the anti-vaccination 
community having influence beyond those who choose to engage directly and actively with 
anti-vaccination content. Interestingly Smith and Graham also argue that social media 
engagement with this type of content is dominated by women, possibly reflecting the continued 
influence of traditional values associated with motherhood and child rearing responsibilities. 
 
Vaccine Development and Manufacture: A Risky Business? 
In the second half of this editorial we consider the role played by commercial and state actors 
in the development of vaccines. As such, we explore the influences and interests shaping the 
development and manufacture of vaccines. We also consider the differences in the 
development and availability of vaccines globally. Vaccine manufacture tends to form part of 
the work of biotech and pharmaceutical companies which are usually based in the commercial 
sector – the profit motive is, as such, highly significant in influencing decisions to develop and 
manufacture. The global vaccine industry is made up of three segments: (1) the large 
multinational R&D-based vaccine manufacturers who have about 80 per cent of the value of 
the global vaccine market but only 20 per cent of the manufacturing volume; (2)  Developing 
Country Vaccine Manufacturers (DCVMs); and (3) small, high income country biotechs and 
niche manufacturers. The last two groups have the other 20 per cent of the value and deliver 
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80 per cent of volume primarily manufacturing large volumes of established vaccines at low 
cost (Towse and Firth, 2020). There is some debate about how far the vaccine market is an 
attractive proposition for pharmaceutical companies. For a period of time vaccines were a 
neglected corner of the pharmaceutical sector, with limited profit compared to other drugs 
although  there is the suggestion that it has become more profitable in recent (pre-COVID-19) 
years with the vaccine market believed to be worth $61 billion because of the global rise in the 
threat of infectious disease (Guzman, 2016).  
Evidence (see Mullard, 2020) suggests that only 6 per cent of vaccines that begin 
development successfully come to fruition in the market. A new vaccine takes on average ten 
years to develop. These timelines and rates of success obviously pose a risk for those investing 
in vaccination research and development. However, the COVID-19 pandemic clearly 
characterises a special set of circumstances because of its global threat in both high and low to 
middle income countries, to public health and social and economic life. Hence, Towse and 
Firth (2020) show that governments across the world have been willing to provide financial 
support for vaccine development. In the UK the government has committed financial support  
to organisations like the Centre for Epidemic Preparedness, and it is also supporting national 
vaccine development by providing direct R&D funding for two vaccine candidates, at the 
University of Oxford (in partnership with AstraZeneca), and at Imperial College London. It 
has agreed to invest at risk in a manufacturing facility that can be used by AstraZeneca to 
manufacture the University of Oxford vaccine (Towse and Firth, 2020) although overall the 
vaccine manufacturing capacity in the UK is limited (Bingham, 2020). AstraZeneca has been 
willing to forego profits from the vaccine at least during the period of this pandemic (Bingham, 
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2020) – although they certainly will profit eventually and there should be significant 
reputational gains (Garrison, 2020) if this vaccine development is successful2. 
The UK government have also invested in the Vaccine Manufacturing and Innovation 
Centre (VMIC) which is a not for profit research company within the national scientific 
infrastructure and whose stated aim is to provide strategic vaccine development and 
manufacturing capability. The apparent willingness here to share the risks of investment with 
the commercial sector and, in some instances, with trialling and manufacturing being carried 
out at the same time, might explain why the time it has been predicted to produce an effective 
and safe vaccine for COVID-19 has been relatively short (varying between 6 and 18 months). 
However, this conceivably might also be part of a rhetorical approach aimed at maintaining 
hope and enhancing public morale in a time of uncertainty (Calnan et al., 2020) although there 
have been some more recent attempts to temper public expectations (Bingham, 2020).   
The highly competitive, global race to produce an effective vaccine for COVID-19 
sheds light on other possible influences on vaccine manufacture. There is the question of how 
far drug companies can be trusted to develop vaccines in the public interest and if they can be 
trusted to supply to all in need globally (Garrison, 2020). Concerns have long been expressed 
about transparency and a willingness to make public their trial results and share data and results 
in a coordinated effort. Also, the expectation is that the vaccine will be universally accessible 
- but this will likely depend on geography, type of healthcare system, as well as commercial 
interests (pricing and profitability) influencing to whom, where and how quickly the vaccine 
is distributed (Mullard, 2020). It may also depend on nationalistic pressures where 
governments negotiate contracts to prioritise the supply of vaccines to their own population 
(Godlee, 2020). 
 
2 The phase 3 trialling of this vaccine was paused and then restarted in the early autumn of 2020 following 
reports of side effect in a patient in the UK arm of the research. A volunteer also died in the Brazil arm of the 
study, prompting a review of the trial but it was established that the individual had not been given the vaccine 
(BBC News, 2020). 
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The recent epidemic of another infectious disease, Ebola, in some African countries 
casts light on a different influence on or approach to vaccine development. The international 
response to Ebola has been characterised as the most recent manifestation of the securitisation 
of global health, and as one consistent with a longer history of securitising infectious diseases 
already seen in the cases of HIV/AIDS, SARS and pandemic flu (Roemer -Mahler and Elbe, 
2016). These authors argue that by portraying or framing this epidemic as a security problem 
exemplified by the sending of the military to this region this facilitated the adoption of 
pharmaceuticalised solutions. This argument suggests that securitisation creates a distinct 
political space for the development, approval and administration of new pharmaceutical 
interventions (Roemer-Mahler and Elbe, 2016). Certainly, this ultimately accelerated the 
development and manufacture of a vaccine for Ebola. However, as Mullard (2020) shows it 
took over 40 years to produce a vaccine for Ebola. This timescale might reflect the political 
and economic context where it originated – in lower- and middle-income countries and where 
the disease did not have a significant enough high-income country burden (Towse and Firth, 
2020). 
Towse and Firth (2020) distinguish between pull and push factors although the balance 
in high income countries may be different to those for lower and middle-income countries. 
Push incentives reduce the costs to organisations of Research and Development (R&D) and of 
building manufacturing capacity, and pull incentives seek to compensate for the possibility of 
the market alone not providing enough of an incentive to “pull” through R&D and 
manufacturing capacity investment. For example, the UK government are currently providing 
push incentives for the speedy development of a vaccine for COVID-19 and Gavi, the Vaccine 
Alliance provided pull incentives for an Ebola vaccine where there was also concern about 
securitisation. Towse and Firth (2020, p.7) state that the “pull mechanism used by Gavi in 2016 
ensured that there was a stockpile of vaccine candidates ready for a subsequent outbreak in 
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2019. At the start of this outbreak, stockpiled doses were licensed for compassionate use, and 
trials were jointly funded by multiple donors. At the end of 2019, a Gavi pull fund of $173m 
(to run from 2019-2025) was established to fund a stockpile of 500,000 doses, to be made 
available free-of-charge to the low- and middle-income countries affected.” Similar pull 
incentives may be necessary in the context of a COVID-19 vaccination in certain parts of the 
world, although the risk nature of COVID-19 necessarily interests actors in high income 
countries more than is the case for some other diseases.  
 
Uncertainties and Regulatory Governance  
In this final section we now turn to consider in detail how governments regulate the 
development and dissemination of vaccines. We also build on the previous section to consider 
how the interests of state and industry might cohere. In the UK, regulatory governance involves 
reviewing evidence from three phases or levels of conventional clinical trials which are carried 
out to assess efficacy and safety within a typical timeframe of six years. The trials could involve 
deliberately infecting persons for reasons of urgency, but these are not favoured for ethical 
reasons and where natural infection is high such as with COVID-19 (Michaelis and Wass, 
2020). In the UK, an expert review of all trial data is then carried out by the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) or the European Medicines Agency (until 
January 2021). The regulators check that the trials show that the product meets the necessary 
efficacy and safety levels. They also aim to ensure that, for most people, the benefits far 
outweigh the risks. After the expert review, the regulator can grant a licence for the vaccine 
which confirms the medical condition the medicine should be used for and the recommended 
dosage. Post market surveillance monitoring in the UK is undertaken by the MHRA through 
the Yellow Card Scheme. Reports of suspected side effects are sent to the MHRA by drug 
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companies (who are obliged to pass on any reports of suspected side effects that are defined as 
serious), health professionals, and, since 2005, patients themselves. 
There are two types of vaccines, preventative and therapeutic, which both require 
regulatory approval as concerned with safety and efficacy (see above) and (in the UK at least) 
are also likely to require regulatory approval in relation to cost-effectiveness. The cost 
effectiveness of a vaccine is believed to be influenced by several factors, including vaccine 
efficacy and durability, severity of disease burden, vaccine price, and costs of delivery 
programmes (Kim, 2011). However, recent literature has highlighted how cost-effectiveness 
analysis can neglect the broader economic impact of vaccines and that socio-ethical 
contributions such as effects on health equity, sustaining the public good of herd immunity, 
and social integration of minority groups (Luyton and Beutels, 2016). 
The UK immunisation programmes to infants, adults and senior citizens are 
preventative vaccines that are administered to otherwise healthy individuals often at a very 
young age. In addition, an increasing number of therapeutic vaccines are being developed, 
which induce anti-viral immunity to alter the course of disease after infection or disease occurs 
(Brassel et al., 2020). In the UK, market access for both vaccine types are separated. The cost-
effectiveness of the assessment of therapeutic vaccines is in the remit of the National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), which generally applies the same criteria as for other 
health-related interventions. However, no therapeutic vaccine has been appraised by NICE up 
until now (Brassel et al., 2020). The Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) 
is an independent committee which advises Ministers of Health in the UK on preventative 
vaccine policy. The JCVI approach aims to be consistent with NICE’s technological appraisal 
process and has a threshold for cost-effectiveness of £20,000 per quality adjusted life year 
(QALY). This said, the especially high economic and social costs of the COVID-19 pandemic 
might mean that a successful vaccine is assessed by different criteria.  
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The trustworthiness of regulatory apparatus has been critically examined particularly 
in respect to whether regulatory agencies are sufficiently independent enough to ensure 
vaccines are safe and effective. The work of Abraham (2008, see also Abraham, 1995, 2009, 
2010) finds that neoliberal corporate bias underpins pharmaceutical regulation. Abraham 
suggests that over time pharmaceutical companies have established privileged influence on 
regulatory procedures. As pharmaceutical companies are often positioned as the ‘customers’ 
of regulatory agencies, who rely on business from pharmaceutical companies for their 
existence, there has been a gradual diminishing of what counts as proof of efficacy and safety 
as well as the length of time taken to review drugs. Long wait times and high regulatory burden 
have been argued by the pharmaceutical industry to stop patients getting the drugs they need 
and as making the costs of R&D too high to be profitable. Considering the vast economic and 
social pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic arguments for even less rigorous regulatory 
review and even more rapid review times for COVID-19 vaccines can conceivably be 
particularly powerfully made. Whilst the pharmaceutical industry and regulatory state work are 
from this perspective in partnership, importantly, neoliberal corporate bias within 
pharmaceutical regulation does not mean that the regulatory state does not have its own set of 
interests that it will assert in the face of high cost or political gain. In the context of COVID-
19, a vaccine seems to have been positioned as the way to restore normal global economic 
functioning, whilst there is certainly significant national and international political capital to 
be won in the development of a successful vaccine (Garrison, 2020).  
Russia purports to have developed a vaccine for COVID-19 which has shown 
‘sustainable immunity’ against the virus based on phase 1 and 2 trials (Burke, 2020) and which 
may be used before the end of 2020 but these findings have been contested by the World Health 
Organisation in terms of how rigorous the evaluation has been and whether it is legitimate not 
to wait for evidence from phase three trials (Burke, 2020, Mahase, 2020). Similar concern has 
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been lodged about the language of haste adopted by the US government in the run up to the 
2020 presidential election3.  In the UK, the MHRA has started rolling reviews of the data 
granted to them in real time, with the aim of speeding up review of efficacy and safety data 
(Ring, 2020), whilst there has been a government consultative proposal which has become law 
(DHSC, 2020) to bypass the licensing process dependent on the advice of the JCVI if a vaccine 
for COVID-19 becomes available which is safe and effective (whilst also ensuring that a wide 
range of healthcare workers are legally allowed to administer the vaccine). However, it has 
been argued that there is the risk that, in this global race against time, efficacy and safety will  
not be given sufficient attention and that the emphasis will be for vaccines that reduce severity 
of illness rather than protect against infection and provide only short lived immunity, which, 
in both ways, might be beneficial for industry profit, and/or political and economic interests 
but not for global public health (Godlee, 2020).  
 
Conclusion  
In this editorial we have discussed what shapes hesitancy towards vaccination amongst the 
public as well as considering the roles and interests of manufacturers and governments in 
vaccine development. We have shown in this editorial how the sociological literature 
concerned with vaccine hesitancy indicates that it is reflective of the nature of decision-making, 
trust, understandings of risk and social responsibility, whilst also being influenced by 
information technology and various forms of media. Critical social science research into 
vaccine development is much less extensive though some important work does exist (see, for 
example, Blume and Zanders, 2006; Hardon and Blume, 2005). Yet, as the Covid-19 pandemic 
has amplified, there are issues in the supply chain which need to come under the microscope 
 
3 Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the US has expressed the need to ensure safety in the 
wake of the pausing of the Oxford/Astra Zeneca trial (Boseley, 2020).   
19 
 
of social science research – particularly what influences the decisions about when, how and 
which populations get access to vaccination programmes and how strong and effective the 
apparatus of regulatory governance is.  
There is a need also to develop a conceptual framework which shows the 
interconnectivity between the supply side of vaccine development and take up. Research has 
explored vaccine trust relations between parents and professionals (Brownlee and Howson, 
2005) and these authors have also tried to extend the understanding of the shape and nature of  
trust relations to wider influences including some discussion of  the role of the media in relation 
to vaccination programmes (Brownlee and Howson, 2006). Brown and Calnan’s (2012) 
analysis of trust relations in relation to the pharmaceutical industry offers a broader framework 
illuminating a ‘chain’ of different bases of trust, which together produce knowledge and 
assumptions upon which patient and public trust is grounded. The same approach can be 
applied to public perceptions of vaccination as well as the interrelationships between the 
provider, the public health system, the safety regulator and the manufacturer in the construction 
of knowledge around vaccines - and thus can act as a starting point for the analysis of risk, trust 




With thanks to Dr. Richard Bates for recommendations relating to the social history of 
medicine and vaccination. Also, to Luke Shoveller for ever provocative discussion. Thanks 
finally to the editor Dr Patrick Brown for a number of highly useful comments.  
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